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Abstract
A new agent-based scheme for secure electronic voting is proposed in the paper. The scheme is universal
and can be realized in a network of stationary and mobile electronic devices. The proposed mechanism
supports the implementation of a user interface simulating traditional election cards, semi-mechanical voting
devices or utilization purely electronic voting booths. The security mechanisms applied in the system are
based on veriﬁed cryptographic primitives: the secure secret sharing scheme and Merkle’s puzzles. Due to
pre-computations during the generation of agent, the voter need not to do computations. The proposed
distributed trust architecture makes the crucial stage of sending votes elastic, reliable, and eﬀective.
Keywords: electronic elections, secret sharing scheme, Merkle’s puzzles, mixnets, mobile agent security,
distributed trust
1 Introduction
During the recent development of all forms of e-life, like e-commerce, e-democracy
or e-government, e-voting is an area of the permanent research. Lately, we observed
that the time of classical voting systems, based on paper-cards and ID, is coming to
the end. Not only the mechanical voting system can make the results of elections
questionable (e.g., USA 2000 presidential election) but problems can also arise from
methods used to gather results by a central authority or from errors during the
counting made by people. The need for electronic voting systems is growing; some
prototypes are tested within diﬀerent countries.
The analysis of such systems oﬀered by diﬀerent vendors in US is presented
in [20]. Most of the commercial systems oﬀer security through obscurity, what is
widely believed to be the worst possible method of protection. Those systems uti-
lize cryptography, but often in an incorrect way, leaving back-doors for intruders.
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On the other hand, there exist quite a few cryptographic schemes which fulﬁll a
wide range of requirements for electronic elections. Their only disadvantage is in-
convenience: they use sophisticated cryptographic tools that make them hard to
implement and require expertise in various ﬁelds. In this paper we propose a prac-
tical electronic election scheme that is quite easy to implement, secure, based on
well-known cryptographic primitives. On the contrary to most e-voting protocols,
the scheme does not expect a voter to do any computations; all necessary compu-
tations are done by the authorities. User only needs to obtain the ballots and send
a selected vote.
Our system fulﬁlls the requirements stated below. Due to its eﬃciency, simplicity
and lack of computations on the voter’s side it can be used in diﬀerent scenarios:
with voters using a computer for voting or with classical voting booths. It can be
also used in semi-mechanical voting systems.
The requirements for electronic election protocols diﬀer very much: from the
most obvious ones, as privacy, to more sophisticated as a receipt-freeness. Most im-
portant ones are discussed below [5], [25]. Thus, completeness requires that all valid
votes must be counted correctly. Soundness provides that a dishonest voter cannot
disrupt the voting process. Privacy means that all ballots must be secret and there
should be no possibility of tracing a voter that cast a certain vote. Un-reusability
does not permit any voter to cast more than one ballot. Eligibility simply means
that only those who are allowed to vote can vote and the system have to provide
means to validate a voter and a permitted number of votes. Veriﬁability prevents
falsiﬁcation of the result of the voting process and a voter should be able to verify
if his vote was correctly accounted. There are two kinds of veriﬁability: individual
veriﬁability, when only the voter can verify the results [26] and universal veriﬁabil-
ity, when everyone can verify that all votes were correctly tallied (in this case some
publication of votes is necessary). Fairness provides that nothing can eﬀect the
voting and no party should be able to compute the partial tally. Robustness means
that all security requirements are completely satisﬁed despite failure and/or ma-
licious behavior by any (reasonably sized) coalition of parties (voters, authorities,
outsiders). Receipt-freeness claims that the voter is not able to prove any coercer
how he had voted. This notion is similar to privacy and widen its meaning.
It is seen that some of the mentioned features are contradictory to others, like
receipt-freeness and veriﬁability. It is hard to create a system or a protocol fulﬁlling
all requirements, especially unconditionally.
The paper [27] describes also some other, additional requirements for the elec-
tronic voting system: dispute-freeness (a voting scheme should provide a method of
resolving all disputes at any stage of voting) and accuracy (a voting scheme must
be error-free). These requirements are typically a part of the veriﬁability postulate.
Similar to the notion receipt-freeness, the idea of incoercibility was introduced: no
party should be able to coerce the voters.
Some of those presented requirements are complementary but there is no de-
ﬁned set of criteria that can be used to fully describe and analyze an electronic
voting system. The recent work of Chaum [9] noticed the lack of an important
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property in most proposed e-voting systems: voter-veriﬁability. While trying to
provide receipt-freeness and incoercibility, some systems do not oﬀer the user any
conﬁrmation that the ballot was received and tallied correctly (if proofs for votes are
not published immediately). For large-scale elections publishing proofs instantly is
very unpractical. Instead, Chaum introduced a notion of voter-veriﬁable elections,
where the voter receives the receipt, which is a conﬁrmation of the fact of casting a
ballot and does not contain any information about the vote. From practical point
of view, when users vote in the electronic booth or use some computer application,
this property is very important.
Main contribution of this paper is a novel scheme for electronic election, that
is secure and enables designing multi-interface, mobile voting architecture. The
proposed system is based on an idea of an authentication protocol with revocable
anonymity, which utilizes a combination of Merkle’s puzzles and a secure secret
sharing scheme. The Merkle’s puzzles provide anonymity and a secure secret shar-
ing scheme is a method of group authentication. Both methods can also be used
for the e-voting scheme to protect voters’ privacy and create eﬀective method of
authorization.
Organization of the paper
The Section 2 describes most important solutions for electronic election schemes.
The following section introduces cryptographic primitives utilized in the proposed
protocol: zero-knowledge and secure secret sharing scheme. Section 4 gives a short
overview of the authentication scheme providing revocable anonymity, which was
an inspiration for the new solution. Section 5 exactly describes the developed pro-
tocol. The next section contains deep analysis of the protocol, both in means of
computational and communication complexity, as well as the security analysis. The
last section concludes the paper and describes some possible improvements to the
discussed solution.
2 Related Work
E-voting systems utilize diﬀerent cryptographic primitives: mixnets (encryption
nets, decryption nets, DC-nets), blind signatures, homomorphic secret sharing
schemes, bulletin boards, proofs (interactive and non-interactive) or homomorphic
encryptions.
Mixnets are similar to anonymous channels that can be used to anonymously
distribute to users credentials needed for voting. A mix is a trusted party that
randomly distributes messages to users, so any eavesdropper is unable to trace the
sender or recipient of a given message. It was ﬁrst proposed by Chaum [7]. Mixnets
can be based on decryption or on re-encryption [24]. DC-nets (dining cryptogra-
phers networks) are an alternative to anonymous broadcast channels, proposed also
by Chaum.
Blind signature was initially utilized to create the ﬁrst protocols for e-cash
applications. Shortly afterward it was used by Fujioka et al [14] to validate votes
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in an election scheme. The idea is that an authority validates the vote not knowing
its value (the vote is blinded).
Homomorphic secret sharing scheme was ﬁrst time introduced in [4]. The
vote is shared among n authorities and then tallied by at least t of them. Those
systems have high communication cost and are not easy to implement.
The homomorphic encryption model utilizes special features of homomor-
phic encryption algorithms. It deﬁnes two operations, ⊕ and ⊗, that, for two
proper votes v1 and v2 and an encryption algorithm E, have the following property:
E(v1)⊗ E(v2) = E(v1 ⊕ v2). This method was introduced in [10].
The bulletin board is a public, broadcast communication channel with mem-
ory [10]. All broadcast information is stored in the memory and any participant can
read it. Voters have an access to write to speciﬁc sections of the board, where they
can publish their votes. Such a board can be implemented using multiple servers.
Proofs are mainly used by voters to prove the authorities the correctness of the
votes they sent. Proofs may be interactive (e.g., classical zero-knowledge proofs) or
non-interactive and simply attached to the vote. They are used mainly in systems
with homomorphic encryptions.
To present the complete survey of e-voting systems we start from Chaum [7].
This scheme is an example of the mixnet model and consists of at least two trusted
parties: TA, the trusted administrator and the mix. TA creates a cryptogram
E(r,K, π) for each voter, where π is a pseudonym for a voter, K is a public key and
r is a random number. TA sends all cryptograms to the mix. Voters obtain their
cryptograms from the mix, which has to know who is eligible for voting. Afterward,
voters prepare their votes utilizing the public key K from the cryptogram: EK(q, v),
where q is a random number and v is a vote. Along with the data previously received
from the mix, the new cryptogram E(r, π,EK(q, v)) is sent to the mix. The mix
compiles a list of pseudonyms and cryptograms with votes to TA, which validates
π and decrypts the vote if π is proper. A modiﬁed version of the protocol was
published later in [8].
The work [26] presents another approach to e-voting based on re-encryption
mixnets. All mixes in this system have a unique private key for the El-Gamal
encryption scheme. There exists a public key for an anonymous channel. Mixes
produce encrypted ballots with proofs for users. They are delivered to voters by
an untappable channel. During the voting stage, the voters choose their votes and
send them via decryption networks. Each mix posts a proof of proper decryption.
Then votes are counted. Eligibility, privacy, fairness and universal veriﬁability
properties are satisﬁed. The last property is provided by usage of the veriﬁable
mixnet together with the publicly accessible bulletin board. The receipt-freeness
property is satisﬁed assuming one-way untappable channels, since a voter cannot
prove its vote to adversary. However, usage of untappable channels makes the
scheme unpractical.
The Fujioka et al. protocol [14] is more convenient for large scale elections.
Apart of voters, it has two parties: counter and administrator, and three phases:
registration, voting and summing. It assumes existence of an anonymous channel
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used by the counter and voters to communicate, usage of a blind signature scheme
by the administrator and that each voter has a diﬀerent digital signature and uses
the commitment scheme to compute the ballot. The protocol is complete, sound,
fair, veriﬁable; privacy is achieved along with un-reusability and eligibility. Also the
maximal fairness is accomplished, since, even if all authorities collude, they cannot
compute the partial tally. However, to obtain this the voter has to take part in
tallying phase (post-vote-casting), which is rather impractical and would make the
scheme hardly scalable. The disadvantage of the scheme is ability of the authority
to add votes for abstained users.
The election protocols based on the homomorphic encryption are described in
various papers: [2], [10], [11]. In the system proposed in [10] the authorities create
a pair of shared private and public keys. Utilizing El-Gamal scheme and those keys
the voters can create their ballots: encrypt their votes and produce a non-interactive
proof of validity, with the zero-knowledge property. After checking the proofs from
the voters, the coalition of honest authorities can combine all correct votes and
utilize proofs to decrypt the product. In the result they obtain the exponentiated
tally of votes, use it to search the tally space for a match and compute the ﬁnal
tally. The scheme fulﬁlls most of requirements described in Section 1, but the
form of votes and necessity of the proofs (and their complexity) makes the scheme
non-scalable. The protocol described in [12] is similar and utilizes the generalized
Pallier’s cryptosystem. A more eﬀective method of decryption and computing the
result is presented in [10].
Another system utilizing the homomorphic encryption scheme was proposed
in [24] and improved in [1], [15] and [23]. During the initial stage the authority
publishes the shared public key (a (t, n) threshold scheme is utilized). Then, voters
register and compute their votes. They post their votes on the bulletin board (here
also correctness of the votes can be checked). All votes are then sent through a
re-encryption mixnet (proofs are generated during this process and can also be
published on bulletin board). Then the votes are veriﬁed and the tally is computed.
The proposed system not only fulﬁlls most of the requirements but also is scalable
and eﬃcient (due to use of mixnets). It can also be modiﬁed to provide receipt-
freeness.
Some other approach to electronic voting, also based on the homomorphic en-
cryptions, was proposed in [2] and [18]. The system is additionally based on tokens
and re-encryption nets. The work [2] improved results of [18]. The system preserves
the receipt-freeness property (and incoercibility, providing the adversary does not
have access to the registration phase), since a voter can generate a false token.
However, the trade-oﬀ is quite high: the veriﬁability and scalability were the price.
Also usage of anonymous broadcast channel makes the scheme impractical (since it
is hard to implement).
Moreover, there exist diﬀerent systems, fulﬁlling the criteria from Section 1
and not based on the mentioned primitives, e.g., based on anonymous multi-party
computations.
A distinct approach is based rather on information-theoretical security than on
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computational security, as in previously discussed cases.
Some systems based on more practical approaches are being currently developed
or tested in Switzerland: Geneva and Neuchatel developed an Internet voting sys-
tems, which is oﬀered as an extension of the postal voting. Zurich developed also
mobile voting systems [13]. The other prototype was developed in Portugal [17],
called REVS. It utilizes blind signatures and is based on EVOX system. The pa-
per [17] describes solutions for failures of communication or problems with servers.
Also a secure authentication mechanism for voters was added. A prototype of the
system is utilized for student surveys.
3 Cryptographic Primitives
Our scheme involves two cryptographic primitives: the secure secret-sharing scheme
and the Merkle’s puzzles. Below we present a short description of all of them.
A secure secret sharing scheme with (t, n) threshold [25] distributes a secret
(block of bits) among n participants in such a way that any t of them can recreate
the secret, but any t− 1 or fewer members gain no information about it. The piece
held by a single participant is called a share or shadow of the secret. Secret sharing
schemes are set up by a trusted authority, called a dealer, who computes all shares
and distributes them to the participants via secure channels. The participants hold
their shares until some of them decide to combine their shares and recreate the
secret. The recovery of the secret is done by the combiner, who on behalf of the
co-operating group, computes the secret. The combiner is successful only if the
reconstruction group has at least t members. Our system utilizes the Asmuth-
Bloom [3] secret sharing scheme. The dealer randomly chooses n prime or co-prime
numbers, called public moduli, so that p0 < . . . < pi−1 < pi < . . . < pn for
i = 1, . . . , n. They are publicly known. Then, he selects at random an integer s0,
such that 0 < s0 <
∏t
i=1 pi. He computes the secret: Ks ≡ s0 (mod p0) and shares:
si ≡ s0 (mod pi). One has to have at least t shares to recreate the secret. The
combiner recreates the secret by solving the following system of equations:
s0 ≡ si1 (mod pi1)
· · ·
s0 ≡ sit (mod pit)
This system has a unique solution (modulo
∏t
j=1 pij) according to the Chinese
Remainder Theorem.
Merkle’s puzzles were introduced in [22]. The goal of this method was to enable
a secure communication between two parties: A and B, over an insecure channel.
The assumption was that the communication channel can be eavesdropped (by any
third party, called E). Assume that A selected an encryption function (F ). F is
kept by A in secret. A and B agree on a 2nd public encryption function, called G.
A will now create N puzzles (denoted as pi, 0 ≤ i ≤ N) in the following fashion:
pi = G((R,Xi, F (Xi)), Yi), where R is simply a publicly known constant term which
remains the same for all messages (called redundancy bits). Xi are selected by A
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at random. Yi are the ”puzzle” part, and are also selected at random from the
range (N · (i − 1), N · i). Guessing Yi allows B to recover the message within the
puzzle: the triple (R,Xi, F (Xi)). Now, he can transmit Xi in clear and F (Xi) can
then be used as the encryption key in further communications. E cannot determine
F (Xi) because E does not know F , and so the value of Xi tells E nothing. E’s
only recourse is to solve all the N puzzles until he encounters the unique puzzle
that B has solved. So, for B it is easy to solve one chosen puzzle, but for E it is
computationally hard to solve all N puzzles.
In our paper any symmetric cipher (e.g., AES ) can serve as G function. To
solve such a puzzle, the key has be guessed (so, the key is Yi from the previous
description). The key for the puzzle should be weak. We are not using Xi and
F (Xi) mechanism the same way as presented in the original Merkle’s paper. We
take advantage of the fact that it is hard for the adversary to solve a whole set
of puzzles in a reasonable time (if the number of puzzles is high enough). Thus,
this mechanism can be utilized to provide anonymity. Moreover, we utilize Xi and
F (Xi) not in bilateral communication but in a more complex way.
4 Authentication with Revocable Anonymity
The protocol that is a basis for the proposed architecture was described in [30]. It
was created to fulﬁll the need for a sensible trade-oﬀ between a user’s need of privacy
and the legal requirements for service providers. It is based on the observation that
the most important users of all networks, including the Internet are companies and
organizations. From the networking point of view, they are built of many single
users that trust some authority, use mostly the same authentication method (in
context of the service) and are somehow managed. Sometimes the trust relationship
between the companies cannot be complete: the service provider cannot be fully
trusted. The companies wish to preserve some information and protect them even
from the service provider. The ability to identity each user would be probably the
most important, e.g., for control reasons. Still the service provider should be able
to link each action with each user. These requirements are contradictory, but can
be balanced. The protocol [30] allows an organization or an authority to identify
each user based on data collected by the service provider. It provides users (within
an organization) with anonymity (called partial or revocable anonymity, because
the user still can be identiﬁed) also enabling the service providers, when needed, to
trace the user with a help of his/her organization.
The goal of the protocol is to provide a user and service provider with eﬃcient
method of anonymous authentication. The anonymity of the user can be revoked by
the service provider with the cooperation of the organization. The protocol consists
of at least ﬁve parties. TTP is the trusted third party, O is an organization, TAO
is a trusted authority within the organization, SP is a service provider, and u is a
user, a member of O.
Initialization phase. First, TTP creates the secret and the shares: Ks and
s1, . . . , sn. Each, subset of generated shares, containing t elements, can be used to
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restore the secret. TTP mark each subset with t shares with identiﬁer, denoted as
xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n− t−1. From each subset t−1 shares are destined for SP and a single
one for O. Table 1 shows possible subsets.
Table 1
Subsets of shares generated by TTP
No. SP ’s shares O’s share
x1: s1, . . . , st st + 1
· · ·
xn−t−1: s1, . . . , st sn
Shares for each participant are wrapped into puzzles. TTP generates three
random keys k, ki1 and ki2 , 1 ≤ i ≤ n− t−1. The ﬁrst key is weak and only utilized
to create puzzle for O: Ek(R,xi, st+i, ki1). The second key, ki1 , is utilized to create
the puzzle for SP : Eki1 (R,xi, s1, . . . , st, ki2). The third key will be later used for
secure communication between SP and TTP , during the veriﬁcation of the restored
secret. TTP stores in its database {xi,Ks, ki1 , ki2}.
After creation, all puzzles can be sent via an open channel to SP and O. For
each puzzle TAO creates multiple tickets Tj for a given period (consisting of a
timestamp, a validity period and a share) and an identiﬁer zj for a new puzzle:
Ek(R, zj , Tj , ki1) (1 ≤ j ≤ M , where M is the required number of puzzles for users).
M depends on multiple parameters, including life-time of system, number of users
and desired security level. TAO sends Eki1 (zj) to TTP for each created puzzle with
a ticket.
Authentication phase. When a user wishes to authenticate itself to SP , he/she
is provided by TAO with a set of puzzles of a form Ek(R, zj , Tj , ki1). The user sends
to SP the whole set of puzzles. SP chooses one puzzle and ”solves” it extracting
zj , Tj = {tj , pj, si} and ki1 . SP checks if tj and pj are valid. SP uses the key ki1
to decipher all his puzzles: if ki1 is proper, one of SP
′s puzzles should be encrypted
with it. The amount of time needed for this is almost the same as for ”solving” one
puzzle. SP extracts from his puzzle ki2 and xi and combines all shares to recreate
the secret (Ks). To validate the secret SP encrypts the pair zj and Ks with the
key ki2 (from its puzzle) and sends them to TTP , along with xi. TTP uses xi to
ﬁnd the appropriate key ki2 , decrypts zj and Ks. The TTP checks if the extracted
Ks is exactly the same as the one stored for the xi. It also uses corresponding
ki1 to check if zj can be obtained from encrypted values sent by TAO. If the
validation is successful, TTP replies to SP . The message is encrypted with the key
ki2 . SP can then send the identiﬁer of the puzzle, zj , to the user and the rest of
the communication can be encrypted with the key ki1 .
The formal description of the protocol is done in a common syntax based on [6]
and examples from [28]. It is presented in Fig. 4.
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Step Initial phase Authentication phase
1 TTP → O: {R,xi, st+i, ki1}k O → U : {R, zj , Tj , ki1}k
2 TTP → SP : {R,xi, s1, . . . , st, ki2}ki1 U → SP : {R, zj , Tj , ki1}k
3 O → TTP : {zj}ki1 SP → TTP : {Ks, zj}ki2
4 TTP → SP : {Y es/No}ki2
5 SP → U : {Y es/No}ki1
Fig. 1. The formal description of the protocol
5 The Proposed Scheme
Our system has at least four parties: TA (the trusted authority), mix, counter and
voters (users).
The trusted authority (TA) is responsible for creating a list of users who are
eligible to participate in the election and for authentication data that allows them
later to vote. It is similar to a manager in an agent system.
The mix distributes the data required for an election to all voters, checking if
they are eligible. The mix is similar to the organization, or rather TAO, in the
original scheme. Its main goal is to protect the voters’ privacy. It is realized as an
agent, rather stationary than mobile, residing at a speciﬁc host and denoted as AM .
The counter collects the votes and validates the voters’ credentials with TA. It
also tallies the votes and publishes them for veriﬁcation. The counter, denoted as
AC , is also a kind of stationary agent.
The voter’s application can be also an agent of diﬀerent type: an application
in a cell phone, an mobile agent that user will sent to the host with mix agent or
counter, or an agent in the electronic booth (it is denoted as AV ). The number of
users is denoted as Nu.
The basic steps of the election are:
(i) TA creates the set of credentials and the list of registered users and sends them
to the mix agent AM .
(ii) For each voter requesting credentials, the mix agent AM creates credentials
from data received from TA. First, it checks if a user has the right to vote.
(iii) The user sends its vote along with credentials to the counter agent AC : the
counter checks the credentials with TA and if they are proper the counter
agent AC sums up the vote, publishing a proof attached to the vote.
Assumptions: TA is trusted to create the valid credentials for voters and validate
them properly during the voting. The mix is trusted by voters not to link them to
credentials created by TA. The counter is trusted to accept votes received from the
voters, providing their credentials are correct, and to publish the proper proofs for
veriﬁcation. All three parties are independent and are trusted not to cooperate (at
least, the mix and TA are trusted not to conspire).
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5.1 The Detailed Scheme
The architecture of the proposed solution is presented in Fig. 2. The scheme has
four major phases: initialization, registration, voting and publication of results.


TA


AC 

AM


AV


















initialization
voting
initialization
registration
registrationvoting
Fig. 2. The architecture of the proposed system
The following notation is used in the protocol:
• secret symmetric keys: k, kCi and k
M
i are the secret keys for a symmetric cipher,
created by TA,
• functions: E (encryption), h (hash function) and g (will be described later),
• votes: V = {v0, · · · , vL} is a set of all possible votes (e.g., v0 can be yes, v1 can
be no, or v0 can be a ﬁrst candidate, etc), vf denotes a user’s selected vote, L
denotes a number of diﬀerent possible votes,
• ballots: B = {b0, · · · , bL} is a set of ballots (utilized by the user to vote),
• secret sharing scheme values: s denotes a share (si denotes the i share), Ks is the
secret, t denotes the threshold and n is a number of shares,
• other: x (is an identiﬁer), R denotes redundancy bits for Merkle’s puzzles (as
described in Section 3).
Initialization. The authentication mechanism is based on the secure secret shar-
ing scheme (described in Section 3). TA creates the system with n shares with the
threshold t. The t − 1 shares are for AC , the rest will be distributed among the
users by the mix. For each secret, TA creates an identiﬁer x for all n− t subsets of
shares that allow to recreate the secret. The value of x for each subset is created in
a random way. They are presented in Table 2.
For each subset of shares (identiﬁed by xi) TA creates a puzzle for AM , pM =
Ek(R,xi, st+i, k
M
i ), and a cryptogram dC = EkMi
(R,xi, s1, . . . , st−1, k
C
i ) for AC .
The puzzle pM is encrypted with a weak random key (k) and then sent to AM .
The cryptogram dC is encrypted with a key from an appropriate mix’s puzzle (k
M
i )
and destined for AC . For each generated subset TA stores {xi,Ks, k
M
i , k
C
i } (and
optionally also shares). For a single secret TA creates n − t puzzles for the mix
and the same number of cryptograms for the counter. After creation, all data
can be sent via an open channel. TA has to create at least Nu puzzles in total
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Table 2
Subsets of shares, generated by TA
Identiﬁer Counter’s shares Mix’s share
x1: s1, . . . , st−1 st
x2: s1, . . . , st−1 st+1
· · ·
xn−t: s1, . . . , st−1 sn
(one for each voter). Assuming that all utilized secure sharing secret systems have
parameters (n, t), the TA has to create at least Nu
n−t secrets. This part of the protocol
is illustrated in Fig. 3(a).
Registration. A voter registers within AM to obtain credentials. The voters
should be validated if they are eligible for elections. There are many diﬀerent
methods that can be used for this purpose, and it is out of this paper’s scope to
choose the best one. A simple one would be based directly on a Guillou-Quisquater
identiﬁcation scheme [16]. Each voter obtains from TA its ID and a secret value σ.
The TA creates a list of all proper IDs and sends it to the mix agent as a list of
eligible voters. The voter utilizes the GQ protocol to prove knowledge of the secret
for the presented ID.
In the presented scheme the mix is a method to create an anonymous channel
between the voter and TTP . It also creates ballots for users, performing instead of
them necessary computations.
After validating the user, the mix solves a randomly selected puzzle received from
TA and obtains authentication data for the user: a share si, a key for appropriate
AC puzzle, k
M
i , and the identiﬁer xi. Data from a single puzzle is utilized for one
user. This data is used to create a set of ballots (B) for the voter. Each ballot is
encrypted with a weak, random key (similar to the one utilized to create puzzles for
AM ). Each ballot consists of a vote (v) encrypted with xi (utilized as a secret key
for a symmetric cipher), the share and the key from the solved puzzle and a proof.
The proof is a digest of the vote v and g(xi): h(v, g(xi)). The function g is known
only to AM . Its main feature is that it is hard to guess its result not knowing the
argument. It can be, e.g., a hash function used with an additional secret string
of bytes or a symmetric cipher with a secret key. Note that the strong one-way
hash function used with a secret argument has the same functionality as a digital
signature but is much more eﬃcient. To allow TA to verify the proof, the mix sends
EkMi
(g(xi)) to TA or publishes the list of all created EkMi
(g(xi)) after registration.
This part of the protocol is illustrated in Fig. 3(b). The ﬁnal set of ballots for a
single user is presented below.
Voting. The voter sends the ballot bf = Ek(R, k
M
i , si, Exi(vf ), h(g(xi), vf )) with
a chosen vote vf to AC . The counter solves the ballot and extracts si and k
M
i .
It uses the key kMi to decipher all puzzles, which it obtained from TTP in the
initial phase. If the kMi is proper, one of the puzzles had been encrypted with it.
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vote ballot
v1: b1 = Ek(R, k
M
i , si, Exi(v1), h(g(xi), v1))
· · · · · ·
vL: bL = Ek(R, k
M
i , si, Exi(vl), h(g(xi), vL))
AC extracts from its puzzle k
C
i , xi and shares. Next, it combines all shares to
recreate the secret Ks. To validate the secret the counter encrypts Ks with the
key kCi (from its puzzle) and sends it, along with xi, to TA. TA uses xi to ﬁnd
the appropriate key kCi and decrypts the secret. TA compares the extracted Ks
with the one stored in the database. It also uses corresponding kMi to mark g(xi)
published by the mix agent. If the two operations are successful, TA sends a reply
to AC , encrypted with the key k
C
i . The counter now decrypts the vote, adds it to
the tally and sends appropriate information to the voter. The counter can use the
key kMi to encrypt the information about success or failure of the operation or to
send the result as a clear-text. This part of the protocol is illustrated in Fig. 3(c).
Note, that the protocol does not require user to make any computations, only to
communicate with appropriate parties, as in classical elections. AC can also convey
xi to the voter as a conﬁrmation of the fact of casting the ballot (to fulﬁll the
voter-veriﬁability property).
Publication of results. After receiving and verifying all votes the counter agent
publishes the results along with all proofs, so users can verify if their votes have
been counted (Fig. 3(d)). In case of any claims about correctness of the results TA
can verify all pairs of votes and proofs utilizing g(xi) values.
5.2 Formal Speciﬁcation
The notation used in this speciﬁcation is based on the one used for SVO logic [29].
An encrypted message m with a key k is denoted as {m}k.
Initialization
(i) TA→ AM : ∀s∈{st,...,sn}{R,xi, s, k
M
i }k
(ii) TA→ AC : {R,xi, s1, . . . , s(t−1), k
C
i }kMi
Registration
(i) AM → TA: {g(xi)}k
M
i
(ii) AM → AV : ∀v∈V {R, k
M
i , si, {v}xi , h(g(xi), v)}k
Voting
(i) AV → AC : {R, k
M
i , s,{vf}xi , h(g(xi), vf )}k
(ii) AC → TA: {Ks}kCi
, xi
(iii) TA→ AC : {Y es/No}kCi
(iv) AC → AV : {Y es/No}kMi
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Fig. 3. Phases of the protocol
6 Analysis
6.1 Performance
All presented results were obtained with the test version of the system, working
on 3.0GHz PC with Windows operating system. The implementation is based on
JADE agents.
Initialization. In this phase only TA has to make computations. It has to create
the secret and shares, generate identiﬁers, symmetric keys, create subsets, puzzles
and cryptograms for AM and AC . The time to create shares and the secret for
system with n = 100 and t = 75, with the size of public moduli 100 bits is just
around 10 minutes. Generating even 100 such sets (of the secret and shares) is
not time consuming, especially, that it can be done oﬄine. Creating subsets, keys
and identiﬁers is fast and omitable in further analysis. Computing the puzzles and
cryptograms is simply comparable to encrypting data (dtotal) of the size equal to
sum of all cryptograms and puzzles. The size of a counter’s cryptogram is equal
to the sum of its elements: dCsize = (t − 1) · ssize + Rsize + xsize + k
C
size. Similarly
the size of A′Ms puzzle can be calculated: pMsize = ssize + Rsize + xsize + k
M
size.
For each secret TA has to encrypt n − t puzzles for AM and cryptograms for AC :
dtotal = (n−t)·(pMsize+dCsize). The encryption time of a symmetric cipher ampliﬁes
almost linearly with the size of data (that is an expected result), so, having the size
of public moduli (for secure secret sharing scheme) and the number of shares it is
possible to estimate the time required by TA to generate the puzzles for each secret.
Registration phase. During the registration phase only the mix has to make
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some computations: solve a puzzle from TA and create ballots for users. Solving a
single puzzle is not computationally hard. As the tests indicate the time to solve a
single puzzle is small, from less than a second to over a minute, depending entirely
on the key’s size. Note, that the actual size of a puzzle is not important, since
only the ﬁrst block of the puzzle has to be decrypted (to validate R). The mix
can either solve the puzzle on-line, while the user is registering or solve all puzzles
oﬄine. Both options are feasible, the only concern could be a number of users
that may want to register at the same time. That problem can be easily solved by
introducing additional mix agent AM . The mix also has to create a proof for each
ballot: h(g(xi), v). We assume, that g is an eﬃcient function (the best candidates
are symmetric ciphers or hash functions), so the time to create g(xi) is negligible. As
discussed previously, the number of votes, L, is relatively small and computing the
hash function is eﬃcient. Thus, we can assume that the total time required by the
mix to create the proofs is equal to NU ·L ·Tproof , where Tproof is the time required
to generate g(xi) and the actual hash (it can be approximated as the double time to
generate the hash). To estimate the time required to create puzzles for voters the
similar reasoning as for initial phase can be used. The mix has to create L ballots
for each user, each one of the size: bsize = ssize +Rsize + k
M
isize
+Esize(v) + hsize. It
is easy to calculate that the total size of a set of ballots for a single voter is rather
small, since for the typical cipher and one-way hash function bsize < 1Kb. Creating
puzzles for such a small amount of data is very fast. So, even for a large number of
users the whole operation is very eﬃcient.
Voting. During the voting phase there is no operation that is either time con-
suming or requiring a large number of computations. First, the counter needs to
solve the puzzle, which is eﬃcient (as discussed previously). Next, AC has to ﬁnd
its own suitable cryptogram: at the average it needs to decrypt a half of its cryp-
tograms. The operation of decryption is similar to encryption in the means of time
and computations, so the required time can be easily estimated. The third opera-
tion of the counter is combining the secret. It requires to solve a set of equations,
using a Chinese Remainder Theorem. The results of the tests show that this opera-
tion is rather fast. TA needs just to ﬁnd appropriate keys in the database, decrypt
the secret and validate it (simply compare it to the stored one). All those actions
are rather fast. Also, the ﬁnal operation of AC is very eﬃcient, since it is only
encryption of the data replied to the user. The performance problems can occur if
many users at the same moment would like to vote and the counter would have to
ﬁnd a lot of suitable cryptograms. However, sensibly selected number of voters per
counter can minimize the risk of delays.
6.2 Communication Eﬀort
(i) Initialization phase: TA has to send to AC and AM all cryptograms and puz-
zles. Basing on calculations presented in the previous section, it is possible
to estimate amount of data that has to be conveyed to each party. The time
required to transmit the data to the appropriate party with the speed 2 Mbit/s
is less then 50 milliseconds for systems with n raging from 50 to 500 for data
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sent by TA to AM and up to 5 sec for data transmitted to AC .
(ii) Registration: during this phase, there is no signiﬁcant communication; the mix
only sends the EkMi
(g(xi)) of the size of approximately 128 bits to TA and a
set of ballots, less than 10KB to a user. Even with a limited bandwidth (e.g.,
2 Mbit/s) and a large number of users system can be eﬃcient (sending the
puzzles to 100000 users would take approximately 45 minutes).
(iii) Voting: during this operation, the amount of transferred data between the
parties is very small (around 384 bits between the TA and AC and around 1
Kb between AC and a voter), so no communication overhead can be expected,
especially that operations during this phase are rather fast and voter should
not have wait long time for reply from the counter.
6.3 Security
Completeness. If the user casts a correct ballot then the counter is bound to ﬁnd
appropriate cryptogram and recreate a valid secret. Moreover, it is able to extract
the identiﬁer xi, decrypt the vote and tally it.
Soundness. To produce a valid ballot, an adversary has to forge the credentials:
the share si and the key k
M
i . He would also have to produce a valid proof for the
vote h(g(xi), vf ). Since the keys, xi and cryptogram EkM
i
(g(xi)) are stored in the
TA’s database, an adversary would have to guess properly all of them. Chances
of the success are extremely low. Even if the adversary is a dishonest voter and
he has access to already used proofs, ballots and even EkMi
(g(xi)) list, it is still
computationally hard to ﬁnd, for a selected proof (h(g(xi), vf )), the values that
were used to create it. For the adversary it is computationally infeasible to guess
proper xi for existing EkM
i
(g(xi)).
A dishonest voter may try to claim that he/she voted other way than it was
tallied, but the counter can prove otherwise by publishing the proof, which is hard
to forge without help of the mix or TA.
Privacy. The ballots are distributed by the mix agent AM and no other party
is able to link a user and a ballot with his/hers vote.
The ballots are encrypted with a symmetric cipher utilizing xi as a secret key.
Since xi is a secret and it is not known to any third party, an eavesdropper observing
the ballots is not able to gain any information on a selected vote.
Un-reusability. The voter obtains a single share as a credential, identiﬁed by xi.
He/she can use only one vote and, when his/hers vote is veriﬁed by the counter, the
appropriate data in TA’s database is marked and cannot be utilized again.
Eligibility. Only proper users, registered and listed, can obtain credentials from
the mix agent AM . They have to obtain proper identiﬁcation data and the zero-
knowledge scheme provides that only users knowing the valid secret (σ) can suc-
cessfully complete the protocol.
Veriﬁability. All users can verify if their votes have been properly tallied by
checking the published list of proofs h(g(xi), vf ). There are two kinds of possible
frauds: the counter does not tally a casted vote or claims the vote was diﬀerent than
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the one actually casted by the voter. If his/her proof is not published, he/she can
show his chosen ballot to TA and it can verify whether suitable data in the database
was marked as used (or the conﬁrmation stage can be added to the protocol, as
described in Section 5.1). In the second case TA can verify the proof presented by
the counter and settle the dispute. TA can also estimate the minimal and maximal
number of voters taking part in the elections basing on the amount of EkM
i
(g(xi))
values created by AM and the number of successful interactions with AC .
Receipt-freeness. The scheme allows the voter to verify if his/hers vote was
tallied by publishing the proofs (h(g(xi), vf )), but does not enable him proving to
any third party what vote was casted. The voter can present the coercer a ballot
bf = Ek(R, k
M
i , si, Exi(vf1), hf2) for the published hash hf2 = h(g(xi), vf2). The
coercer can verify that the hash is published, but he is unable to verify the claimed
vote, since it is encrypted with xi. Moreover, it is easy for the voter to create a false
ballot with a selected vote and a published hash, since the coercer cannot verify the
proof h(g(xi), vf ), because the function g is secret and known only to the mix, and
the list of produced g(xi) values is known only to TA.
Robustness. The non-participating voter does not inﬂuence the course of elec-
tions. All appropriate authorities (counter, mix and TA) have to take part in the
selected stages of elections. The single authority is not able itself to change the
results of elections; all three have to collaborate to falsify the proof and/or ballot
or to identify the user who casted a selected vote.
Scalability. There are multiple ways to extend the application based on the
agents. One of the methods is to create hierarchical structure, based on triples of
agents: AM , AC and ATA (an agent representing TA). Each triple is responsible
for registering users in a certain region and for tallying. Also, a single secret can
be utilized to authenticate more than one user and the system can utilize multiple
mix agents (with diﬀerent or the same sets of puzzles) and counter agents.
7 Conclusions
To improve eﬃciency of the presented method some modiﬁcations can be introduced.
Registration phase (mix’s actions) can be divided into two independent sub-
phases: the ﬁrst one, for receiving authentication data from TA and creating bal-
lots, and the second one, for distributing ballots to users. These two phases can
be additionally distributed between two diﬀerent kinds of agents (denoted as A1M
and A2M ), that would provide system with even higher degree of privacy due to
distributed trust. The modiﬁed architecture is illustrated in Fig. 4.
The ballot for our scheme is practical and easy to create. Moreover, other
cryptographic primitives along with presented credentials can be used, e.g.: blind
signatures (the user can ask TA or the mix agent to sign the vote), or a public key,
distributed with credentials, unique for each xi, that is later used to encrypt the
vote.
All those methods can be viewed as more secure for a typical e-voting system
than the simple one-way hash function but they require some computations on user’s
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Fig. 4. Modiﬁed architecture with more distributed trust
side, which is a disadvantage, especially for mobile devices or cards.
The presented system is an eﬃcient and practical scheme for electronic elections.
It utilizes the well-known, secure cryptographic primitives to achieve privacy and
anonymity by distributing trust. It is complete, sound and very scalable due to
usage an agent-based architecture. The system oﬀers possibility of easy extension,
simply by adding an additional mix agent or counter agent, when required. One
of the main advantages of the proposed scheme is avoiding users’ computations.
Therefore it is very ﬂexible and easy to use for all kinds of elections. A user can
vote in a traditional way (the votes can be printed) or in electronic booths. The
system also provides a user with mobility: the user can have an agent program in his
mobile device that will send his chosen ballot to the counter agent; the user just has
to be in a range of any wireless network (GSM/3G/802.11). The system can operate
with many existing technologies to transmit votes and still maintain security due to
utilized cryptographic solutions. A prototype of the EVAS: E-Voting Agent System,
based on mobile agents and utilizing UMTS is currently under development.
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